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**Inside-Out:
Why Engaging Intragroup Conflict May Help
Intergroup Negotiations Succeed**

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External Efforts to Promote Negotiations in Internal Identity-based conflicts

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Introduction

I hypothesize that a major reason negotiations over identity-based conflicts fail is that there is inadequate attention given to the process of intragroup pre-negotiation. Identity based conflicts, both within countries and transcending borders, present a fundamental challenge to a more peaceful world order (Gurr, 2000). They are similar to all conflicts in that they include struggles over resources or, politically stated, struggles over who will get what, when, and how (Lasswell, 1935). Moreover, like most conflicts, they are about clashing and competing goals and priorities (Wilmot and Hocker, 2000). However, identity-based conflicts however are also a unique class of conflicts that require special handling because unlike goal or resource conflicts they are deeply-rooted in historical fears and frustrations to groups' existential needs and values (Rothman, 1997). Too often such conflicts go from bad to worse when opponents in such conflicts pre-maturely meet and try to solve problems or negotiate solutions before sufficient intragroup agreement has occurred. Characteristic of many identity-based conflicts is that the deeper they run and longer they last, the more internal schisms within each side become part of Gordian knot of such conflict. Then as moderate groups within each side begin to lean toward one another, the hardliners within each side lean out and the likelihood of intergroup agreement further diminishes., intragroup pre-negotiation focusing first on the internal dynamics of disagreement and consensus building *within* their groups could enhance the chances of successful negotiation between them by disabling this tendency before it takes root. This chapter will set my own agenda for promoting intragroup pre-negotiation as one method of improving intergroup negotiations in identity-based conflicts.

Based on a combination of my experience as an intervener in identity-based conflicts around the world over the last two decades and my current theorizing about failures and opportunities in this line of work, I suggest that negotiation theorists and practitioners pay more systematic attention to the internal dynamics of pre-negotiation *within each side*. This may enhance the chances of successful negotiation between adversaries, particularly in identity-based conflicts. In such conflicts where people's individual and collective sense of purpose, safety and relatedness are at stake, and often at risk, having sides focus on their own solidarity as well as differences can help build a trajectory for the same kind of analytical process to occur constructively between the sides. When groups are internally divided and splinter into opposing camps, reaching agreement with an outgroup becomes even more difficult. This is the common cyclical dynamic in intransigent conflicts. 1. Internal dynamics lead at least to differences over agenda and tactics, if not over essential strategies. 2. Sides become convinced, or coerced, that negotiation is somehow useful at this point (or less harmful than not engaging in it). 3. Parties begin negotiation without sufficient internal agreement, and then 4. such internal dynamics play themselves out vociferously when the sides meet. Such dynamics include projections of each sides' failings as a way in part to avoid, or even heal, continuing rifts within one's "own family;" attributions about the perfidity of the other side's nature and polarization between the good Us and the bad Them (See Rothman, 1997).

Thus, to make progress in what are variously called "protracted social conflicts (Azar, 1990)," "identity based conflict (Rothman, 1997)," "intractable conflicts (Coleman, 2000)," or "intransigent conflict" (Rothman, 1992, Ross and Rothman, 1999), something has to break this internal-external conflict escalation cycle. To break this cycle I suggest a

two step process of goals-to-grievances that each side engage in, first within their side and then again between their sides. The first step is for sides' to gather key representatives of central, often opposing positions within their own side towards the other side and reach agreement on their shared goals for the future. The second step is for participants in this intragroup pre-negotiation process to reach agreement on their grievances with the other side, framed in terms of barriers the other side has constructed in the past through its attitudes and actions to achieving this future. These two steps are then repeated when the sides' meet, however, in reverse order. First groups' surface and engage in dialogue about their respective grievances. When sides' feel their concerns are adequately aired and on the table, then and only then do they move from the identity-based grievances about the past to cooperative and goal-orientated negotiation for a new future as will be illustrated below (Gorman, 1999). One of the key problems this sequencing addresses is that in normal interest-based negotiation, parties who come to the table with deep grievances that are not systematically aired are rarely able to develop an adequate or authentic future-orientation due to these lurking but unsurfaced grievances about the past. Making explicit those grievances, making them discussable, can go a long way to making the psychological space necessary for parties to develop a necessary perspective allowing them to see the past for what it is – important, often painful and not to be forgotten – but also to not overshadow the possibility that the future can be forged based on goals for that future, and lessons from the past can be learned and not subconsciously, or aggressively, repeated.

In addition to reducing the likelihood of intergroup explosion and the possibility of mutually acceptable negotiation outcomes, the internal negotiation process may usefully serve as a form of intragroup “conditioning.” For instance, when groups that have


historically had deep internal rifts discover that through disciplined and sufficient preparation they can reach agreement over a shared agenda for discussions with the other side (i.e. shared goals and defined grievances), they begin to see the value of such a process and may be willing to use it to both encourage and facilitate constructive engagement with the other side.

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State of the United States from 1973 - 1977, is famous for saying that he never began a negotiation until the agreement was already in hand (Sheehan, 1976). A bit more modestly, I suggest that in identity-based conflicts, negotiations should be launched after each side separately, often with the assistance of third parties, works on its own “house” in ways that also set an agenda for meeting with the other side. Once successful outcomes are in sight during negotiations, each side must again strategize, both separately and in a coordinated way, how best to communicate with - and often persuade - its own “hard-liners” that agreement with the other side is not abdication or dangerous concession but, instead, fuller expression and protection of its own identity needs.

A Contingency Approach

It is important to operationally distinguish between identity conflict and more routine conflict. A good place to start is with a cogent definition. The editors of this volume provide one: identity is “conflictual when two identities are negatively interdependent, in a zero-sum or threatening relationship. When my being me depends on you not being you, or when your being you threatens my being me, there is an identity conflict” (Zartman and Antsey, page 1), it is useful to operationally distinguish identity-based conflicts from other

more routine conflicts such as those over goals and resources (Rothman, 1999) I do so by metaphorically picturing conflict as an iceberg, with identity-conflicts at the murky bottom. Goal conflicts rise above identity-based conflicts and reside translucently just beneath the water's surface. Resource conflicts are above the water are in plain sight, they are empirical and most tangible of the three.



Identity-conflicts, like in the metaphor are far beneath the surface, they can't be understood or seen empirically. Rather they are deep and murky. The bottom of the iceberg is what sank the titanic; identity issues are what cause many negotiations to fail and wars to begin. In short, identity-based conflicts are about threats and frustrations to existential

needs and values that are threatened, frustrated or pursued in conflict between groups.¹ They are commonly mired in deeply rooted and emotional issues that make straightforward solution seeking extremely difficult at best.

Continuing with the metaphor, going up the iceberg towards the surface, but still just below it, conflicts are commonly about mismatched goals. Goals, in their most elemental form, are those things we seek to accomplish or attain. Problems or conflicts, most essentially, are those things that keep us from fulfilling our goals. In a widely quoted operational definition of conflict, Hocker and Wilmot (1985), suggest that *conflict is the interaction of interdependent people who perceive incompatible goals and interference from each other in achieving those goals* (see also Folger, Poole and Stutman, 2005). Like the iceberg beneath the water, they are opaque. You can't quite see goals of the other side and often even one's own goals are ill-defined or too complex to articulate simply. However, unlike identity-based conflicts, when engaged proactively and in an environment of good listening, problem solving and effective communication, goal-based conflicts need not be too troubling or difficult to manage successfully. Rather, without a great deal of emotional

¹ The needs approach to identity-based conflict suggests that the main cause of such conflict and the reason they are often unresponsive to conventional negotiation, and even to interest based bargaining, is because they are rooted in the threat and frustration to basic human needs and their fulfillment. Such needs are variously defined by various negotiation, peace and conflict theorists. John Burton (1979, 1990a) articulated them as irreducible collective human needs for security, predictability, recognition, distributive justice meaning and control. Negotiation theorists Dean Pruitt and Jeffrey Rubin (1986) defined them as needs for security, identity, social approval, happiness, clarity about one's world, and physical well-being. Peace studies pioneer Johan Galtung (1990) articulated them as needs for security, freedom, welfare and identity. Anstey and Zartman define them as needs for *protection, participation, power, privilege, and purpose (in this volume)*. Legal expert of minority affairs, Yousef Jabarin (2008) summarized needs in one main category, "participatory equality."

content, goal-based conflicts can often be dispassionately and fairly rationally managed by disputants with or without third party assistance.

Finally, above the water, conflicts occur frequently over competition for scarce resources and who will get them when and how . With effective and timely negotiation and problem solving resource conflicts also can commonly be settled and mutual gains achieved for all parties.

This levels of analysis approach also visually suggests an important feature of identity-based conflicts that distinguishes it from the other two. Identity-based conflict contains within it the other two levels of conflict as well. A conflict for example over *home* and ones access to and control over it (the root of many international identity-based conflicts), will also be about goals (e.g. goals to accomplish sovereignty and territorial integrity) and resources (e.g. ways to protect and promote economic resources). On the other hand goal conflicts will be primarily about goals and resources (e.g. to establish an independent state in order to be able to gain and control economic and military resources). And resource conflicts, while also having seeds of goal disputes and even identity-issues if and when they are poorly handled, are fundamentally about tangible resources and who controls them, when and how (e.g. gaining access to and control over scarce resources).

Another way of differentiating these conflict levels of analysis is to think about Identity-based conflicts as the ultimate set of “Whys”? Why do we care so deeply? Why are we feeling threatened and frustrated? Goal conflicts are about “What for?” What are we seeking? What are our goals and priorities that are at stake? Resource conflicts are simply the “What” of conflict. What are we seeking to get or preserve?

With such a “levels of analysis” approach, the next step before focusing on solution

seeking – in the form of negotiation or some other problem solving process that seeks to foster collaboration and coordination between conflict parties and reduce destruction and violence – is determining the right kind of approach for which level of conflict. In their classic article, Sander and Goldberg describe the importance of “fitting the forum to the muss.”(1994) Fisher and Keashley describe the need and outlines of a contingency approach to conflict analysis and resolution (1991). I believe this is the cutting edge of the dispute resolution field.

Anyone who has dealt with identity-based conflicts, whether at home or abroad, knows they are deeply emotional and require a special type of handling. Applying conventional interests-based models to them can make them worse. Why? Because they are rooted in the deep past and the indignities, physical suffering and psychic wounding that has occurred to stimulate them in the first place. They fester and worsen if not addressed. When the antagonism of the past is engaged so too all the hurts and emotions of that past break forth and are volatile. However, surfacing identity-conflicts is essential if they are not to fester and explode, and can be very therapeutic (Rothman, 1997, 1992). On the other hand, if a premature focus is made on solution seeking, or common interests beneath conflicting positions (Fisher and Ury, 1981), such conflicts can deepen and worsen for the “treatment.” When identity-conflicts are identified and can be evaluated carefully and surfaced safely (first within groups and then between between them) they can be rationalized and viewed as also including contending goals and competition over resources. Then identity conflict can begin to be moved “upwards” (ie.g. see the iceberg model) towards more negotiable goal or resource conflicts where conflict management and interest-based bargaining may become possible. For indeed, while deep conflicts are about

identity and identity is by definition not easily negotiable (though not static by any means), recall that the ROI analysis says they are also about goals which may be coordinated when well articulated, and about resources which indeed are often, or should often be, the focus of bargaining.

Having safely surfaced antagonism – which is commonly done in a process of interactive and narrative articulation of core needs and values that each side feels has been threatened or frustrated by the conflict with the other side and some acknowledgement of that subjective reality (see – see Kelman, 1987, Rothman, 1998, Kaufman and Davies, 2002) – it is now for parties to engage in some form of coordinated goal-setting process. Finally, having articulated goals and to some degree engaged in integrative bargaining such as log-rolling and other forms of goal trade-offs, only now can parties who were locked in identity-conflict engage in a more formal bargaining process over resources.

The bulk of this chapter will now delve in to the ‘Whys and Hows’ of safely surfacing identity-based conflicts, initially through intragroup processes, to make them ready for conflict management, problem solving and negotiation over goals and resources. I will describe a process I have been using and lay out my own agenda for launching this process within each side locked in identity group conflicts prior to intergroup encounter.

a. Identities and Goals - Past or Future Orientation

The main difference between goal-based and identity-based conflicts is their respective past or future orientation. The former looks toward some new future. Differences in goals arise over definitions, interests and priorities. My colleague Gary Klein

and I talk about such goals as mired in a “conflict goal-field” in which contending goals compete with one another for primacy (Klein and Rothman 2008, and Klein, 2009). Often times, as will be discussed in some depth below, a major reason for goal conflicts between groups is that there are ill-defined and unresolved goal conflicts *within* each group that then spills over in to goal conflicts between sides.

Identity-based conflicts looks back at some set of “chosen traumas” from the past and the way in which they continue to influence and cloud the present. Volkan suggests that in all ethnic conflicts parties select certain historical traumas they have suffered and hold fast to those as ways of defining their distinctive identity. They are often symbolized in specific historical events and sometimes with artifacts. An example of the latter is a key commonly found among Palestinian refugees representing their exile from their homes. (Volkan, 1988) . A narrative example of an identity conflict was shared with me by my colleague Benjamin Broome in an encounter he had with an old Cypriot man.² In response to Ben’s question about the hurts of his past, the old man waved his hand forward past his right ear saying “right before my eyes.” Ben inquired, “don’t you mean your past is behind you” (waving his hand backwards past his left ear). “No,” the old man responded continuing to wave his hand forward, “my past is before my eyes like it were today, my future (now joining Ben in waving his hand behind him) is very unclear.” Indeed identity-based conflicts are often those with high emotional content that live on in memory and deeply, often negatively, influencing the way life is experienced in an ongoing basis. Another classic example is the story of Palestinians with a key to the family home from which parents or grandparents were exiled. “When my grandfather was on his deathbed,” began Khwala, one

² Personal communication

of my Palestinian-Israeli students³, “he took the key from the house from which he was exiled in 1948 and went for a last visit. The Jewish woman in the house was alarmed when we knocked on the door and asked us to leave.” My student told this story with a burning anger in her eyes. I asked her why this story was so important to her. This kind of Why question is a delicate – often all about identity can sound controversial, or deeply caring (Friedman, Withers and Rothman, 2003). I think I struck the right chord as she answered quietly with a tear in her voice, “because my grandfather died a month later and never saw the inside of his home again. Because my family is scattered. We don’t live in our home. We are exiles here in Israel.”

In the field of conflict resolution there is a common distinction made between positions and interests (Fisher and Ury, 1981).⁴ The former are those unbridgeable attitudes and beliefs about a conflict that divides parties from each other. The latter are understood as underlying concerns that often overlap in interdependent ways that can be met through cooperative and functional solutions. Distinctions between identities and goals are more complex and therefore should be more precise. This is partly the case because all identities contain goals and resources. In fact, some would say identities are constituted of specific goal configurations in which, as an example, someone could have intrapsychic conflicts within their various internal goal-fields (e.g. as a hardworking professional and a devoted parent and the competing time demands and constraints upon each role), just as groups could have internally and externally contending goals (see

³ Personal communication during Fulbright Fellowship at Jezreel Valley College in Israel, 2006, shared with permission

⁴ In many of my previous writings I have suggested the distinction between interests and identities. I believe the distinction between goals and identities is more useful and precise. See in particular Rothman and Olsen, 2001.

chapter four in Jones and Brinkert, 2008). This complexity is what commonly leads people to believe that all conflicts are identity-based. But I believe this is an important mistake that leads to imprecision in conflict analysis and intervention design, part of which a good contingency model could help correct. I believe it important to understand that while all identity conflicts do contain goal and resources issues, the reverse is not necessarily the case. That is sometimes a cigar is just a cigar and sometimes goals are not deeply rooted in existential issues, they are, for example, just about “getting it done.” But “higher” level conflicts can fairly easily move downward. For example, when resource issues are not addressed there is a reverse trajectory that commonly occurs and contending goals begin to emerge. Moreover, when goal conflicts are not proactively or effectively addressed, threats and fears commonly emerge and identity-conflicts follow. Thus, getting the analysis as right as possible and in timely matter on a contingency basis (if we have a conflict at this level we should use this type of intervention) is important

I suggest that a more nuanced and differentiated way of viewing resources, goals and identities could be a key in preparing for effective intergroup negotiation in identity-based conflicts. I believe a major problem in intergroup negotiation where identity issues are key is that parties, while ostensibly bargaining over how best to meet overlapping or competing goals, are actually engaging indirectly in deeper disputes regarding their historically threatened or frustrated identities. If so, then it is important to keep them conceptually and practically distinguished. This would help in preparing the ground for constructive intergroup negotiation. Here’s a process I have been experimenting with over the past few years:

1. Intragroup goal setting - Each side in a pre-negotiation process begins with a

clear articulation of their respective goals and values in general and which may be furthered in a negotiation with an adversary (particularly where they are currently blocked, or perceived to be blocked, by that adversary). Where there are internal differences about these goals or how to best achieve them with particular reference in to the other side these should be bridged as much as possible before an intergroup meeting, or at least clarified where bridging isn't possible, in part so these internal dynamics will not unnecessarily spill over in to intergroup work.

2. Intergroup encounter - After viewing and discussing each others' goals interactively, it is determined whether the groups can move into future oriented dialogue or negotiation about their conflicting and shared goals, or if beneath the goals there are deeper identity conflicts that must be surfaced and engaged first. For an example of the former, in a workshop for educationalists from Greek and Turkish communities on the island of Cyprus, a cooperative project was launched to create youth exchanges and educational tools for mutual understanding (Rothman, 1999). On the other hand, in a intervention conducted in 2009 between Israelis and Palestinians conducted by the author where the Israeli goals were primarily operational in nature, the Palestinian goals were more fundamental and reflected a less negotiable set of requirements and expectations.

3. Intragroup conflict framing - In this latter case of identity-based conflicts

emerging in the goal discussion between the sides' each side goes back to continue its own work separately and discussed and lists the kinds of identity-based grievances it feels about the other side (e.g. "their goals are too general and conditional," e.g. "their goals are too narrow" etc.) and which it feels need to be at least surfaced and made discussable, even if not resolved, for "room" to be established for progress in goal-based negotiations.

4. Intergroup encounter (ii): The sides then meet again to discuss their respective antagonisms and are guided through the difficult process of airing these grievances, having them heard and eventually reaching agreement that a focus on the future is both necessary and possible and that further focus on the grievances of the past will be unconstructive. Moreover, at this point in the dialogue parties commonly are fed up with the ongoing and generally fruitless recitation of blame and counter blame (necessary though it has been) and they then agree that they want assistance from a fairly directive third party to help them move into this future and goal-oriented focus despite what might be a natural tendency to move back in to grievances about the past (see Rothman, 1992, 1996).

5. Preparing the ground for intergroup negotiation

When groups that have historically had deep internal rifts discover during intragroup discussions that they can talk about those issues effectively and reach

agreement over a shared agenda for discussions with the other side they begin to see the value of such a process. This fosters a kind of negotiation conditioning in which aspects of this same process can be usefully repeated at the intergroup phase:

- i. Reaching goal agreements for the intergroup dialogue or negotiation,
- ii. Dealing effectively with disagreements enroute to reaching goal agreement without trying to solve them, but rather making them discussable and recognizing each others' voice and the legitimacy of their perceptions.⁵
- iii. Analytical re-articulation of previously emotionally volatile grievances and reframing them from practically unbridgeable and emotionally-laden identity-issues to potentially bridgeable goals and resources for the future.

Case Study 1: Israelis and Palestinians Talking about same things in the same way for the same reason

In the following case study, Israeli and Palestinian peace activists begin with goal setting, but as in the model described above find they are stuck in antagonisms about the past. Thus, they surface their differences separately and discuss them. Then they talk about underlying concerns and values and finally move on to planning for future cooperation.

One of the most important things about this approach to dealing with deep conflict effectively is helping disputants *talk about relatively the same things in mostly the same ways for essentially the same reasons*. While sides' often think they are talking about the same things and so forth, when they dig in to each sides' assumptions and priorities they often discover they are missing each other entirely. In this case of a two-day workshop for Israeli and Palestinian peace activists who were beginning to work together on a joint project to develop and train others in a new methodology for dialogue and development (called "KUMI"), we began by asking the two groups to come up with internal agreement about their goals for their work together as a coalition. After listing their separate goals I noted two goals that appeared to overlap and provide direction for collaboration. I was quite wrong.

⁵ An important new approach to conflict resolution has emerged with the publication of a book called *The Promise of Mediation* (1995) which suggests that a major purpose of mediation is voice and empowerment (or recognition) of sides' in a conflict, not necessarily the end or resolution of the conflict itself. See also my essay in a collection devoted to "empowerment mediation" called "Reflexive Dialogue as Transformation (1996)."

The Palestinians said their goal was to “End the Occupation.”

The Israelis said theirs was to “Transform the Conflict and End the Occupation as a Short-Term Goal.”

When I suggested to the two sides that these goals appeared to very much overlap and provide a frame for cooperative goal setting, while the Israelis said yes, the Palestinians were fairly emphatic that they did not. Said one Palestinian participant, “The question of ending the occupation should take precedence over any question of basic needs.” The Palestinians said they viewed the Israeli goals as “conditioned responses.” That is, added another Palestinian participant, while it seems you, the Israelis, see ending the occupation as a means to an end, he went on, we see it as an essential purpose in and of itself. At this point ending the occupation is core to our expression of our identity at this time in our history. Thus, while the Israelis were ready to move on to future-oriented dialogue and planning, the Palestinians were not. They felt unheard and largely misunderstood.

As suggested in the levels of analysis iceberg, the Israelis were working on goals for their future in which ending the occupation would lead to fulfilling their shared ideal of a two state solution. The past, they felt could and should be put behind them and a new future clearly and cooperatively pursued. The Palestinians on the other hand said for us, ending the occupation is a statement of identity; occupation is the prime example of the way the past and your oppression dominate our present and make us uninterested in talking about the future, at least to start with.

Thus with agreement from the Israelis to move backwards before a hoped-for future orientation that might follow, each group reconvened and made its own list of things that they “blamed each other for” regarding their respective and different goals. Here are their respective lists:

Israeli complaints	Palestinian complaints
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - You speak as representatives of Palestinian not as a unique individual. - If End of Occupation is primary goal (Contradiction); we only work on structure, conflict will not be transformed and violence will continue. - By forcing/imposing on us to accept End of Occupation as our primary goal, you’re hampering our efforts to influence the conflict within Israeli society and between Israelis and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ending Occupation is conditioned with a process that may take a long time and may be not applicable - Lack of direct action on the ground as peace believers (peace camp). - Peace camp confused regarding 1948 Palestinians and their status. Peace believers have many internal conflicts, confusions that are reflected in their power in the Israeli community and leads to un-definable mainstream

<p>Palestinians.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Concerned that conflict transformation is not seem by you as an overall goal. -Want you to take some responsibility for the situation I won't have legitimacy with in my constituency without partnership with you on the "big picture" (e.g. just peace) 	
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After making these lists (and for the some of the Israelis this was a painful experience which several felt would be counter-productive "why do we need to blame them?" they asked but eventually went with their group in surfacing their complaints), the groups reconvened and asked questions of clarification about the points on the other sides' lists.

After this antagonistic discourse went on for a couple hours, sometimes quite vociferously with some necessary breaks and even some tears, I asked the participants if they felt progress was being made. While some said it was crucial to raise these issues, they mostly and with almost one voice said that they were eager and ready to move beyond this blaming dynamic. After all, that's why we are seeking to work with each other. Said one participant:

It is difficult to go through such an experience but I'm glad that we have. I've been wondering when these issues would come up—I had thought that maybe we all had such similar opinions that no disagreements would come up—which I didn't believe—we are all going to be working [together] as trainers, and it is important that we will have at least examined these issues even if we don't come to agreements about all of them. So overall I'm feeling a bit spent, but looking forward to the next steps in the process.

I asked them if they wanted to move in to a different type of discourse and analysis. Everyone but one Palestinian woman, "Raida"⁶, was emphatic that they had enough. She, on the other hand, said she hadn't expressed the full depth of her hurt and anger. So I invited her to say more. She did. I then asked the group as a whole if they were ready to move in to a discussion of their respective "resonance" (or the Whys of their Antagonism; colloquially I explained when you point your finger at someone, note that the other three fingers point back at yourself. Thus, instead of talking further about what you blame them for, talk about why your anger and concerns are so important to you. Share in narrative form, why these complaints about them are so deeply rooted and important for you in your life experience). Again the group said yes, and very eagerly so as they were weary and wary about further antagonism, but Raida stood her ground. "No," she said, "I am not really finished. However, to not block the group I am willing to try to move in the direction you

⁶ Fictionalized name

recommend.” I asked her if she was sure and she nodded, but with some continued reticence.

We reconvened after a break and as participants shared in narrative form their deeper concerns and inquired of each other about their respective stories, Raida indeed continued to frame her narrative in terms of what the Israelis had done to her, instead as most of the others had done in terms of why it so deeply mattered to her. I told her she was being very consistent with what she had said in terms of not being ready to move forward and invited her to say a few more words about her antagonism. I then looked to the Israelis to see if they needed to respond in kind, but they said they did not. We took another break and I spoke privately to Raida. I asked her if she felt finished with the blaming phase now and ready to move in to a more internal narrative discourse that could set a stage for a future-oriented discussion. She said yes firmly. And indeed when we reconvened she was now fully in step with the rest of the group.

At this point they moved fairly quickly in to resetting their goals in a kind of a two-step sequencing in which ending the occupation as a statement of principle would be followed with on the ground planning and efforts to foster trust and cooperation between the two sides of this coalition to build conditions for transforming the conflict in practical and concrete ways.

Here are some examples of Resonance in their discourse (that is speaking very much first person but in relationship to the other and the dilemmas they share). I framed the discussion as follows.

At this point, it is about going beyond feeling good or badly towards each other towards a change in the way we think, that is towards analytical empathy. “I don't necessarily agree with you but I deeply understand that for you it is reality.” Each participant is now invited to share his/her narrative:

Palestinian woman - Sometimes I think why to do this work with the Israelis (accusations at home, difficulties to move through risky roads to Beit Jala, can work in my own society, etc). I so far find answers about personal interest (skills, etc) or commitment to my work place. I wanted to share these doubts with you. You (pointing to an Israeli male) were not online when the Israeli army was in Gaza. I was asking myself – is he in Gaza in reserve duty? I didn't ask him – I was fearful the answer is that he was there.

Jay – what do you tell your family about all this?

Same Palestinian – my sister works with the Israelis. With her it is easier. But in the family others tease me – this is normalization; why do you work with the Israelis? Also at work two colleagues refuse totally to attend. I try to talk about changing public opinion in Israel; Israel is the powerful side. It will not change until Israeli minds and society will change. This is how

the director of my organization explained to me the need – we should know more of Israelis; support our friends in the Israeli peace camp.

Israeli woman – [...after working for many years for peace and] just before the war in Gaza I said ‘I cannot continue with this any longer’ – I decided to enter a bubble in Tel Aviv. I wrote an email to a Palestinian friend – I am here but I cannot do it anymore. He answered – ‘what do you want me to say to my colleagues: that the only friends we had on the other side no longer want to work with us? And what will you tell your children?’ This brought me back. I think we are really interdependent. My daughter still says – it is not about dialogue it is about politics. What I know very clear is that we need you –Palestinians- there. I understand anti-normalization and its reasons and at the same time see that this killed the peace camp.

Palestinian man - Almost from the first word that was uttered I was having flashbacks of ‘conflict groups,’ ‘people to people work,’ the very processes which lead us nowhere. Now more than ever we know that if it took us months for us to agree to be part of the project than we need to make sure that the Kumi process will be something different. I’m not referring simply to hope, which the Palestinians gave up on long ago. To start any process our condition is to end occupation. What we are doing right now seems to be moving towards connecting on the human level, but that is not the issue. We know each other and agree upon most things. The difficulty is that we will have to go back to our societies. If I go back and tell them that I took part in a dialogue that sounds remotely like the things that have gone on until now, I will simply be told that they do not want to see me any more. It is crucial that we bring these questions to the fore if we are going to avoid repeating the projects which have failed.

Jay-Why does ending the occupation mean all those things to you which you mentioned, honor, dignity, etc. ?

Palestinian man -Freedom is a very basic thing—it means that it shouldn’t be conditioned—the conditions thing is about identity and about freedom—we all know that ending the occupation does not necessarily mean living in peace—when I say Palestinians mean it when they say that ending occupation should not be simply a stage in the process. After 20 years in the process, talk about hope, trust doesn’t mean anything. We are talking about a very primary level, even though ending the occupation sounds huge it has to be understood that this is very primary, it is the least we can ask.

This conversation proceeded for a couple hours and then shifted in to a option generating mode for cooperation that was quite creative and future oriented. Joining in to mixed groups of Israelis and Palestinians, they came up with a couple action ideals:

- ✓ Development of new conflict engagement methodology, tools and skills; train others in it and spread it far and wide; establish joint think/do tank to work separately and together
- ✓ Develop web-based networking tool for people who have participated
- ✓ Improve capacity of grassroots movements to access community to influence decision-makers; integrate extremists to limit future violence

- ✓ Develop support system for re-entry of participants back to their home communities after these conflict engagement workshops
- ✓ Inform others in our communities and families that there are Israelis and Palestinians who are committed to working with each other for peace
- ✓ Develop a reality show about efforts to build bridges between Israelis and Palestinians

As is so often the case with this process, it is truly about going slow to go fast. First, the antagonism about the past is safely framed (i.e. through intragroup problem listing) and surfaced (i.e. through joint inquiry and carefully facilitated statements of hurt, disappointment and anger). This is often a long and quite difficult experience (one I note to the participants who understandably express reservations about replaying the conflict dynamic “out there” in the room, that is a kind of artistic intensification of reality that will in the scheme of things be short and will make “room” for something new). Next, however, it is often the case that it is fairly easy to quickly move at this point in to a future-oriented goal setting and action planning process that is deeply owned by everyone and sustained by them.

Case Study 2: A Broad-Based Process (Cincinnati Police-Community Relations Collaborative)

In this case study of a city-wide goal-oriented, but conflict initiated, vision process, a focus on goal-setting enabled a city to move away from confrontation politics (including a riot) and confrontational policy making (through a federal court) toward a deeply collaborative agenda setting and policy making process. While it’s origins were accusations of racial profiling, a riot in response to a police shooting of an unarmed African American male, it kept a future-oriented focus on police community relations – beginning with goals and objectives including a good deal of narrative about values and identities, in to a future oriented resource and policy oriented process of new police practices and problem solving oriented community policing and partnerships with the community itself in fighting crime and disorder and building a new sense of partnership and trust)

The Cincinnati Collaborative for improving Police-Community relations following the riots that occurred in that city in 2001, was order by a Federal Judge and involved data gathering from 3500 stakeholders, and meetings between 900 of them to form goals and action plans to shape their future regarding police-community relations . Through an online

questionnaire and data analysis web-system (supplemented by interviews and paper-and-pencil questionnaires when useful), citizens were invited to answer a simple What, Why, How questionnaire:

- *What* are your goals for future police-community relations in Cincinnati?
- *Why* are those goals important to you and what experiences, values, beliefs, and feelings influence your goals? and
- *How* do you think your goals can best be achieved?

After only a month of a “getting out the voice” campaign, the first of 8 four-hour feedback sessions was held at a local church, with religious and social service leaders (who specifically requested the opportunity to kick off the process). Following this first session, at a pace of one or two a month for the next six months, each stakeholder group in turn was invited to participate in feedback sessions with other members of their own group (e.g. intra-group) to dialogue and reach consensus on a platform of principles. Participants in each feedback session selected representatives to work together with representatives from the other seven groups (e.g. inter-group) to craft a platform of goals for improving police-

community relations. This inter-group platform then guided negotiators constituted of the lawyers for the parties (who had all year served on the Mediator’s Advisory Group) as they worked to successfully craft a settlement agreement forged out the “Vision of the Future” given to them by the representatives of the 3500 participants.

While the result of the process was ratified in a Federal Court Agreement signed in August, 2002 mandating its oversight during a five-year implementation process for which \$5 million is set aside by the city, the lasting power of the process is much more internally-derived. That is, people’s hearts and hopes shaped this agreement. When they shared their “why” responses, first on the questionnaire and afterwards in small groups during the feedback sessions, they establish the value basis of the entire effort. People’s “why” stories captured concerns about fairness and respecting differences, needs for safety, and expressions of support for the police. These discussions were tremendously powerful. They enabled the citizens of Cincinnati to experience resonance with one another—to find commonalities between their own and others’ fears, hurts, hopes, and dreams (See “Participants’ Voices”).

Many found this outlet to express themselves critical—up until that

Vision of the Future: A Collaborative Platform

1. Police officers and community members will become proactive partners in community problem solving.
2. Build relationships of respect, cooperation, and trust within and between police and communities.
3. Improve education, oversight, monitoring, hiring practices, and accountability of the Cincinnati Police Department.
4. Ensure fair, equitable, and courteous treatment for all.
5. Create methods to establish the public’s understanding of police policies and procedures and recognition of exceptional service in an effort to foster support for

Participants Voices: The following examples illustrate the types of “whys” that emerged from the process:

- “I would really like to see people respect each other’s values and beliefs, even when they are different. I want all cultures to be treated with respect and fairness...in order for us and our children to feel safe, everyone must be treated fairly, it is the only way.
- “For once in my life I’d like to feel safe...I fear for safety, especially for young people”
- “Police are afraid of doing their job...we need to understand their side too.”

point, they felt that they were not being listened to and that their concerns were not being heard. As a young African American woman said, "When we felt pain, no one from the city came to listen to us. We needed someone to comfort and listen to us." Healing began as city leaders finally

heard people's ideas. The inclusive and participatory process has helped citizens to feel a sense of ownership for the agreement, and it has helped them to move from fear and mistrust to cooperation and joint problem solving. The ability and willingness to truly listen and hear others will continue to be critical as Cincinnati's citizens and public officials begin to implement the changes that are outlined in the settlement agreement.

Intergroup negotiations, whether in the form of tough bargaining or interest-based win-win type processes, are normally future oriented. In interest-based bargaining for example, an analytical process of interactively uncovering and communicating each side's needs and interests, including those frustrated in the past, the focus is upon what could be done to foster mutual goals or positive sum outcomes for each side's future. I believe this is one major reason identity-based conflicts are often unresponsive to such processes and declared "intractable." Given how past-oriented such conflicts are, a future oriented process misses the main issues and may even cause further frustration among those who commonly feel their main concerns and grievances are often over-looked or even willfully disregarded. Too often they hear the common reframe, "just get over it already and move on..." A major need expressed by parties locked in identity-based conflicts is that their narratives be heard and their grievances recognized as valid and important (Rothman, 1992). Indeed, I would say that a major part of engaging identity based conflicts is about making possible a rich telling and deep listening to each side's hurts, grievances, fears and frustrations. (Northrup, 1989). When an exchange of such voice and recognition does occur

in such conflicts regarding historical narratives, a psychological space otherwise clouded and narrow may be somewhat freed up. This may then make “room” for the kind of future-oriented goal negotiations so lacking and ultimately necessary for deeply rooted identity-based conflicts to become less destructive and responsive to negotiation.

Focusing Within: A Research and Practice Proposal

To repeat my main hypothesis: a major reason negotiations over identity-based conflicts fail is that there is inadequate attention given to intragroup pre-negotiation. Too often conflicts go from bad to worse when opponents in ethnic and identity-based conflict prematurely meet and try to solve problems or negotiate solutions before sufficient intragroup agreement and conditioning has occurred. Instead, intragroup prenegotiation focusing first on the internal dynamics of disagreement and consensus building *within conflict parties* could enhance the chances of successful negotiation *between them*.

I believe that insufficient focus on each side’s internal conflicts fundamentally prevents sufficient change - much less sustainable change - in the hearts and minds of participants in these encounters. Without this focus, conflicts with the other side become a source for deeper division *within* each side - that is, within one’s own group. Then, the agenda for encounter with the other side, including negotiation, reverts to a more aggressive win-lose dynamic that characterizes deep conflict. On the other hand, conflicts within groups become projected onto the conflict with the other side and intractability follows.

Moreover, if intergroup encounter and negotiations is somewhat successful with parties bridging differences and reaching agreements, it is not uncommon for their respective hardliners to “blow up” (sometimes quite literally) agreements reached in the negotiation

room. Even if this doesn't happen, the fear that it will often keeps each side closed and fearful about taking risks and building bridges. Thus, another benefit of adequate pre-negotiation is a process of post-negotiation in which sides' work separately, and as useful in a coordinated way, to package private agreements for at home public "consumption."

Intragroup Pre-Negotiation

Most broadly characterized, pre-negotiation is the effort by all sides of a divide to quietly, out of the public eye and in non-binding, exploratory ways, set an agenda for eventual negotiation (Rothman, 1991). More specifically, pre-negotiation has the double goal of helping to establish a will to negotiate as well as a momentum that carries negotiations to a successful conclusion. If as defined in this volume (Antsey and Zartman, p.) "negotiation is the process of identifying an appropriate partner and constructing a joint pact," then pre-negotiation is the process of helping parties define issues around which a joint pact becomes possible, and helps adversaries find avenues toward partnership.

The conventional wisdom about negotiation is that it should forge some type of compromise between adversaries in which each side attempts to garner as many concessions as possible and to give up the least concessions as necessary. Most often, negatively interacting and mutually enforcing exclusive positions limit individuals engaged in negotiations because they are typically interested in winning the battle of public opinion and shoring up their positions.

Differently, in identity-based conflict, the purpose and the process of negotiation requires considerable reformulation. Because conflicts are about identity, the normal concession-

convergence model may be counterproductive. If issues of identity (control over destiny, safety, dignity, etc.) are at the heart of the conflict, then compromise over such “non-negotiable” needs and values may well be impossible. Indeed, such negotiations might even escalate the conflict if they fail - as in the Second Intifada following the failed US-brokered negotiations in 2000 between Israelis and Palestinians. Instead, if before getting to the table, negotiators re-envision negotiation as a different type of win-lose game, or war by other means, to a mutually beneficial and joint problem-solving process that helps each side to address its respective and overlapping identity needs, sustainable and positive outcomes for all sides may be more readily achieved during negotiation.

In identity-based conflicts, a coordinated pre-negotiation phase in which each side examines and resolves its internal differences may be essential for successful intergroup negotiation. In this way, each side may prevent its members from externally playing out internal divisions at the negotiation table. More specifically, unless each side bridges internal differences during a coordinated pre-negotiation phase, each side risks that its internal “hard-liners” - who hold and espouse attributional analyses of the other side - may wreak havoc before or during actual negotiations. For example, internal hard-liners might keep parties from arriving at the negotiation table in the first place. Or, internal hard-liners might successfully push through an adversarial agenda by antagonistically framing issues and viewing negotiation as a win-lose battle and, thereby, make their attributions of the other side self-fulfilling prophecies. Moreover, if the internal hard-liners do not achieve their maximalist positions, they might later wreck the negotiation process.

As an example, after a recent negotiation, powerful outside stakeholders rejected a deal that negotiators from their *own* side had reached with the other side. After these powerful

stakeholders/hard-liners replaced the initial negotiators, the hard-liners quickly marginalized some members of the new team when these members sought to accommodate the other side during the subsequent negotiation. As a result, because the maximalist agenda prevailed, the two sides ultimately failed to reach an agreement. If, in contrast, the group had invested time in dealing with its own internal divisions by finding some 'Golden Mean' between them by clarifying their goals and values before settling on opposing strategies, I believe the group would have most likely and fairly easily reached an agreement with the other side.

My central hypothesis is that if each side builds necessary and sufficient internal agreement about both its underlying needs and values and the ways to achieve its underlying needs and values through negotiation with the other side during a coordinated pre-negotiation process, both sides are more likely actually to negotiate and to create mutual gains outcomes during negotiation. Furthermore, if each side forges agreement across its own internal divisions, then *both* sides may mirror this dynamic during eventual negotiation *between* sides and, for that reason, create a problem-solving - instead of a win-lose - orientation.

In identity-based conflicts, where the main issues are often threatened or frustrated needs and values, deep internal consensus may be forged around such needs and values. Thus, an intragroup negotiation process could be designed to be most responsive to such an agenda once articulated separately and coordinated interactively (perhaps with the help of "internal" mediators who have helped guide the intragroup pre-negotiations).

Conclusion: Critical But Neglected

Both in theory and in practice, international conflict resolution tends to neglect the area of intragroup relations and internal pre-negotiation. Therefore, if we are to make meaningful and sustainable progress in creatively and constructively handling identity-based conflicts between groups, I believe that we must correct this. Otherwise, attributions rule, projections continue, and, predictably, failures flourish. While I do not believe that focusing on intragroup pre-negotiation is a panacea, it is fertile ground for more research and emphasis in the field.

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